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Security considerations (v2)

This page summarizes SPEC-v2 §9. Where they differ, the specification wins.

Threat v2 defense What remains
Replay of a captured proof Verifier-issued, stored challenges claimed atomically once; session binding; stream sequence Metadata is visible; use TLS
A future quantum adversary against archived signatures Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 must both verify A simultaneous break of both algorithms
Scope escalation by an intermediate Scope intersection; identity:delegate required to delegate None
Stolen agent key Signed status under a separate key, mandatory freshness, short lifetimes Exposure until the revocation is published, delivered, and applied
Stolen root or issuer key Rotation proves continuity only; a fork freezes the authority; recovery under an offline root A compromised current key can rotate to an attacker key
Challenge forwarding by a malicious verifier verifier_id leads the session context; expected-agent binding Forwarding an intact challenge to its bound agent
Middleware rebinding a proof Middleware Custody Profile The custodian can still sign new proofs
Clock manipulation Post-claim checks use the claim store’s authoritative clock; exclusive deadlines; regression fails closed A compromised authoritative clock
Key substitution or ambiguous trust records Trust only from caller-authenticated configuration; complete-key match; ambiguity fails closed As strong as the trust bootstrap
Rollback of claim store or journal Independent checkpoint; anchored journal head; new epoch and log after lost state Undetected if the checkpoint shares the primary’s failure domain
Status key misuse Role-separated status keys bound per epoch A compromised status key can hide revocations until its epoch is replaced

Out of scope: key theft at endpoints, social engineering of principals, compromise of an agent platform, metadata leaks, and side effects at the receiver (a receipt does not prove or deduplicate an effect).

  • Trust anchors. Pin complete root keys from an authenticated channel. A discovery URL or a TLS connection alone is never a trust anchor. v2.0 defines no registry or HTTP discovery binding.
  • Key custody. Custodial and middleware deployments use envelope encryption, never persist plaintext keys, and never tell users keys stay on their device when the operator holds them.
  • Revocation freshness. Size max_status_age_seconds and max_list_lifetime_seconds to the consequence of the action, and state your maximum exposure.
  • Clocks. Synchronize the authoritative clock with authenticated time. Offline devices subtract worst-case drift from the challenge age and skew bounds.
  • Constraints. A constraint proves consistency with the context the verifier supplied, not that the context is true. resource_path is not filesystem confinement.
  • Physical deployments. v2.0 cannot express a geofence or speed limit. Do not describe a v2 proof as enforcing one. An asserted GPS coordinate is not attestation.
  • Public endpoints. Return one generic response for unknown, expired, used, and mismatched challenges.
  • human_id in a receipt is association metadata, not proof that a person exists, was present, or approved anything.
  • Application policy runs after release and may only narrow a released decision.