Security considerations (v2)
This page summarizes SPEC-v2 §9. Where they differ, the specification wins.
What the protocol defends
Section titled “What the protocol defends”| Threat | v2 defense | What remains |
|---|---|---|
| Replay of a captured proof | Verifier-issued, stored challenges claimed atomically once; session binding; stream sequence | Metadata is visible; use TLS |
| A future quantum adversary against archived signatures | Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 must both verify | A simultaneous break of both algorithms |
| Scope escalation by an intermediate | Scope intersection; identity:delegate required to delegate |
None |
| Stolen agent key | Signed status under a separate key, mandatory freshness, short lifetimes | Exposure until the revocation is published, delivered, and applied |
| Stolen root or issuer key | Rotation proves continuity only; a fork freezes the authority; recovery under an offline root | A compromised current key can rotate to an attacker key |
| Challenge forwarding by a malicious verifier | verifier_id leads the session context; expected-agent binding |
Forwarding an intact challenge to its bound agent |
| Middleware rebinding a proof | Middleware Custody Profile | The custodian can still sign new proofs |
| Clock manipulation | Post-claim checks use the claim store’s authoritative clock; exclusive deadlines; regression fails closed | A compromised authoritative clock |
| Key substitution or ambiguous trust records | Trust only from caller-authenticated configuration; complete-key match; ambiguity fails closed | As strong as the trust bootstrap |
| Rollback of claim store or journal | Independent checkpoint; anchored journal head; new epoch and log after lost state | Undetected if the checkpoint shares the primary’s failure domain |
| Status key misuse | Role-separated status keys bound per epoch | A compromised status key can hide revocations until its epoch is replaced |
Out of scope: key theft at endpoints, social engineering of principals, compromise of an agent platform, metadata leaks, and side effects at the receiver (a receipt does not prove or deduplicate an effect).
Deployment duties
Section titled “Deployment duties”- Trust anchors. Pin complete root keys from an authenticated channel. A discovery URL or a TLS connection alone is never a trust anchor. v2.0 defines no registry or HTTP discovery binding.
- Key custody. Custodial and middleware deployments use envelope encryption, never persist plaintext keys, and never tell users keys stay on their device when the operator holds them.
- Revocation freshness. Size
max_status_age_secondsandmax_list_lifetime_secondsto the consequence of the action, and state your maximum exposure. - Clocks. Synchronize the authoritative clock with authenticated time. Offline devices subtract worst-case drift from the challenge age and skew bounds.
- Constraints. A constraint proves consistency with the context the verifier supplied, not
that the context is true.
resource_pathis not filesystem confinement. - Physical deployments. v2.0 cannot express a geofence or speed limit. Do not describe a v2 proof as enforcing one. An asserted GPS coordinate is not attestation.
- Public endpoints. Return one generic response for unknown, expired, used, and mismatched challenges.
human_idin a receipt is association metadata, not proof that a person exists, was present, or approved anything.- Application policy runs after release and may only narrow a released decision.
